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ABSTRACT
Machine learning algorithms, when applied to sensitive data, pose
potential threat to privacy. A growing bodyof priorwork has demon-
strated that membership inference attack (MIA) can disclose spe-
cific private information in the training data to an attacker. Mean-
while, the algorithmic fairness of machine learning has increas-
ingly caught attention from both academia and industry. Algorith-
mic fairness ensures that the machine learning models do not dis-
criminate a particular demographic group of individuals (e.g., black
and female people). Given that MIA is indeed a learning model, it
raises a serious concern if MIA “fairly” treats all groups of individ-
uals equally. In other words, whether a particular group is more
vulnerable against MIA than the other groups.
This paper examines the algorithmic fairness issue in the con-
text of MIA and its defenses. First, for fairness evaluation, it for-
malizes the notation of vulnerability disparity (VD) to quantify the
difference of MIA treatment on different demographic groups. Sec-
ond, it evaluates VD on four real-world datasets, and shows that
VD indeed exists in these datasets. Third, it examines the impacts
of differential privacy, as a defense mechanism ofMIA, on VD. The
results show that although DP brings significant change on VD,
it cannot eliminate VD completely. Therefore, fourth, it designs a
new mitigation algorithm named FairPick to reduce VD. An ex-
tensive set of experimental results demonstrate that FairPick can
effectively reduce VD for both with and without the DP deploy-
ment.
1 INTRODUCTION
Research and advances in the field of machine learning has re-
sulted in algorithms and technologies for improving cybersecurity
by helping identifying security threats and system vulnerabilities
[50, 51, 60]. However, a line of recent research has shown that
machine learning also can enable novel and sophisticated privacy
attacks that leak information about the training dataset [23, 47,
54]. Particularly, one such attack called membership inference at-
tack (MIA) can infer whether an individual record is included in
the model’s training dataset [53] by using machine learning tech-
niques. It has been shown thatMIA can lead to serious privacy con-
cerns when the training data contains sensitive information (e.g.,
medical records and financial information).
The problem of algorithmic fairness of machine learning has
attracted considerable attention from both academic and indus-
try in the recent years. The key of algorithmic fairness is to en-
sure that a machine learning model does not discriminate against
a particular demographic group (e.g., black people). There have
been several cases showing that the current ML models are indeed
discriminated. For example, as shown by a recent study [13], the
current criminal risk assessment tool named COMPAS (standing
for Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative
Sanctions) predicts the criminals’ recidivism risk (i.e., the crimi-
nal will re-offend) within 2 years indeed discriminates black de-
fendants - black defendants who did not recidivate were incor-
rectly predicted to re-offend is nearly twice as high as their white
counterparts. To address the fairness issue, enormous efforts have
been spent on defining fairness models and metrics [5, 7, 21, 21]
as well as developing fairness-enhancing machine learning algo-
rithms [7, 35, 38, 61]. It has been identified that one of the main rea-
sons of bias in learning is the heavy imbalance of different groups
in the training data [17]. For example, the underlying cause of
the discrimination by COMPAS is the imbalanced distribution be-
tween black and white defendants in the training dataset.
Many real-world datasets that the prior MIA works have ex-
plored not only contain demographic information of individuals
but also are heavily imbalanced among different demographic groups
(as we will show in the empirical study). Therefore, MIA, as a learn-
ing model, faces the same concern if it is biased towards some par-
ticular demographic groups (e.g., black and female people). There-
fore, one of the fundamental questions that has to be investigated
is whether some demographic groups are more vulnerable to MIA
than other groups, due to the skewed distribution of the input data.
The fairness issue is also related to the defense mechanisms
againstMIA. In the literature, multiple defense mechanisms against
MIA (e.g., [34, 44, 48]) have been explored. However, none of these
defense mechanisms can provide a theoretical privacy guarantee
against MIA. On the other hand, differential privacy (DP) [15] pro-
vides a rigorous privacy guarantee against MIA if the training pro-
cess is differentially private [53].
However, DP only provides a theoretical bound of such privacy
protection. Typically, the application of DP does not specifically
consider the demographic features of individuals, whereas these
features are important for the fairness measurement. Thus it re-
mains unclear how applying DP on the target model will impact
the fairness of MIA.
In summary, in this paper, we address the following important
research questions:
• Does MIA treat different demographic groups unfairly such
that some demographic groups are more vulnerable than
the others? If it does, what is the underlying cause of such
unfairness?
• What is the impact of differential privacy, as a defense mech-
anism against MIA, on MIA’s treatment of different groups?
Will it reduce the vulnerability disparity by MIA?
• How to design effective bias mitigation methods to reduce
the vulnerability disparity, before and after applying DP as
the defense?
Our contributions. Fairness and privacy are two equally im-
portant issues of machine learning. Most of the existing studies
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Figure 1: Framework of membership inference attack
have investigated these two issues separately. To our best knowl-
edge, this is the first work that studies algorithmic fairness in the
context of membership inference attack and its defenses. We make
the following contributions:
• We formalize the notion of vulnerability disparity (VD) to
quantify the degree of fairness in MIA’s prediction results.
VD is adapted from the state-of-the-art fairness definition
named equal opportunity [28]. Intuitively, VD measures the
difference in the success probability of MIA for different de-
mographic groups.
• On four real-world datasets, we evaluate VD of MIA for dif-
ferent race and gender groups. Our results prove the exis-
tence of VD for both without DP and with DP applied on
the target model. The results also show that DP incurs un-
predictable, sometimes significant, change of VD.
• We analyze the underlying cause of VD as well the impacts
of DP on VD under different privacy settings, and demon-
strate that VD is largely determined by the data distribution
of the training data, for both without and with DP deploy-
ment.
• We propose a new reweighing method named FairPick to
mitigate VD. The key idea of FairPick is to reduce the dis-
parity of data distribution among different groups by a user-
specified threshold, where the threshold controls the fair-
ness of MIA output. The experiments result show that Fair-
Pick can greatly reduce VD while preserving the utility of
the target model.
The paper is organized as following. Section 2 introduces the
preliminaries. Section 3 presents the details of implementing DP
as the defense mechanism against MIA. Section 4 demonstrates
the existence of vulnerability disparity and detailed analysis. Sec-
tion 5 discusses the details of our mitigation algorithm. Section 6
discusses the related work. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we elaborate on the preliminaries of membersihip
inference attack (MIA), differential privacy (DP), and algorithmic
fairness in the literature.
2.1 Membership Inference Attack
Membership inference attack (MIA) is a privacy-leakage attack that
predictswhether a given recordwas used in training a targetmodel [52].
It works under a setting where the target model is opaque but re-
motely accessible, and it requires the target model to report the
prediction probability of different classes.
Technically, MIA follows aworkflow as shown in Figure 1. Given
a target model H which can be considered as a black-box to the
attacker, the attack starts with synthesizing data that mirrors the
training samples of H . The most general means of data synthe-
sization is to initialize a random sample and gradually improve its
quality by using the output ofH . On basis of the synthesized data,
MIA creates a group of shadow models to approximate the target
model. Each shadow model is trained with the samples that are
randomly picked from the synthesized data as well as the output
of these samples byH . Aided by the shadow models, MIA derives
the final attack model, which is typically a binary classifier in the
format of a neural network. This model is trained by taking as the
inputs as the shadowmodels’ prediction probability on the initially
synthesized data and the output as considering whether those sam-
ples participated in the training of the shadow models. As demon-
strated by Shokri et al. [52], the attack models constructed in such
anmanner can produce high attacking fidelity. AsH outputsmore
than 1 label class, MIA indeed consists of multiple attack models,
each pertaining to a unique classification label class ofH . In sum-
mary and formally, MIA can be described as:
M : x∗,A[H] → {0, 1},
where A[H] represents the access to the target model H , x is
an arbitrary data point, and 0 means MIA predicts x∗ as a non-
training sample ofH and 1 otherwise.
2.2 Algorithmic Fairness
The problem of algorithmic fairness inmachine learning (ML) algo-
rithms has attracted considerable attention in the recent years. For-
mally, given a dataset consisting of n i.i.d. samples {(Ai ,Xi ,Yi )}
n
i=1
from a joint distributionpA,X ,Y with domainA×X×Y , whereA de-
notes one or more protected (discriminatory) features (e.g., gender
and race), X denotes other non-protected features used for deci-
sion making, and Y denotes the outcome feature. A fair ML sys-
tem should ensure that the predicted values Yˆ of Y do not have
discriminatory effects towards particular groups (defined by the
associated A values) or individuals. In this paper, we use A = 1
(A = 0, resp.) to denote the protected (unprotected, resp.) group. In
the fairness community,Gender=“female” and Race=“black” are typ-
ically considered as the protected groups on the sensitive attributes
Gender and Race. The ML community has proposed a multitude of
formal, mathematical definitions of fairness. Intuitively, these fair-
ness definitions are concerned with the protected groups (such as
racial or gender groups) and require some statistic of interest be
approximately equalized across different groups. Standard choices
for these statistics include positive classification rates [8], false pos-
itive or false negative rates [28, 39] and positive predictive value
[11].
In this paper, we consider a commonly-used fairness measure-
ment named equal opportunity [28], which requires that protected
and unprotected groups should have equal true positive rate. We
pick this fairness definition among a number of candidates (e.g.,
statistical disparity [7] and equalized odds [28]) because we are
only interested in the true positive results by MIA (i.e., the mem-
ber records that are identified byMIA). Formally, equal opportunity
is defined based on disparity DI , which is measured as below:
DI = Pr (Yˆ = 1|A = 1,Y = 1) − Pr (Yˆ = 1|A = 0,Y = 1), (1)
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Table 1: Details of data-sets used in our study
Data-set # of Record # of Attr # of Class Prot Attr1
Adult 4.5K 14 2 G & R
COMPAS 24.5K 10 2 G & R
Broward 17.2K 8 2 G & R
Hospital 110K 20 4 G & R
1 Prot Attr indicates the protected attributes, with G and R mean-
ing Gender and Race.
where A = 1 (A = 0, resp) denotes the protected (unprotected)
group respectively, and Yˆ ∈ {0, 1} denotes the predicted value of
label Y . We only consider the binary classification (i.e., Yˆ ∈ {0, 1})
as the MIA model is a binary classifier. Intuitively, given the target
outcomes,DI quantifies the discrepancy between the true positive
rate on the protected group (A = 1) and the unprotected group
(A = 0) based on their protected characteristic. While DI = 0, Y
satisfies equal opportunity [28], indicating enforcement of equal
discrepancies across different groups.
2.3 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy (DP) is the de facto standard in measuring
the disclosure of privacy pertaining to individuals in a group [15].
Roughly speaking, a differentially private algorithm ensures that
the inclusion or exclusion of an individual record does not signif-
icantly affect the result of arbitrary analysis. Formally, given an
arbitrary data domain X , and an arbitrary output domain T , a ran-
domized algorithm F that maps a dataset to output satisfies ϵ-DP
if for all dataset pairs D1 and D2 differing on at most one record,
and for all subsets S of the output domain T :
Pr [F (D1) ∈ S] ≤ e
ϵ × Pr [F (D2) ∈ S],
where the probability is taken over the randomness of F , and ϵ
(called privacy budget) specifies the level of guaranteed privacy. In-
tuitively, larger (smaller, resp.) ϵ providers weaker (stronger, resp.)
privacy protection.
3 DEFENDING MIAWITH DIFFERENTIAL
PRIVACY
To serve the objectives of our study, we first reproduceMIA attacks
on several real-world datasets and demonstrate the use of DP as a
defense. This section covers the details.
3.1 Reproduction of MIA
In general, the reproduction of MIA follows the workflow as de-
scribed in Section 2.1. In the following, we explain the important
specifics.
Data collection and pre-processing.Weuse four real-world datasets1
thatwere widely used by the fairness and privacy communities.We
introduce these four datsets briefly:
1Both Adult and Hospital datasets are used in the original evaluation on MIA [52].
• Adult2 dataset that includes 48842 instances and 14 attributess
describing information about individuals from the 1994U.S. cen-
sus. The prediction task is to determine whether a personmakes
over 50K a year.
• COMPAS3 dataset contains criminal history, jail and prison time,
demographics and COMPAS (which stands for Correctional Of-
fender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions) risk scores
for defendants from Broward County, Florida. The prediction
task is to infer a criminal defendant’s likelihood of becoming a
recidivist (i.e., a criminal who re-offend).
• Broward4 dataset is a refined and cleaned version of COMPAS
dataset. It can achieve betterMIA accuracy thanCOMPASdataset.
• Hospital5 dataset stores the hospital discharge data of the in-
patients stays in several health facilities and released by the
Texas Department of State Health Services from 2006 to 2009.
The dataset includes the demographic information such as the
gender, age, race of the patients, their treatments, and length of
stay. The prediction task is to infer the patient’s main procedure
based on the attributes other than secondary procedures.
More details of these four datasets are summarized in Table 1. We
consider two attributes, namely gender (G) and race (R), as they
are law-regulated protected attributes [1] in the fairness commu-
nity. We also further pre-process the four datasets prior to train-
ing and testing; the records with missing values are removed and
all the features are converted into numeric values. We keep the
categorical features and do not encode them into binary values.
Model building.To facilitate our explanations of vulnerability dis-
parity, we consider the decision-tree based ID3 model [24] as the
target model, due to its simplicity and interpretability. We only
consider binary classification in this paper. Our target model can
be replaced with other ML models. For all the datasets, 50% of the
samples are used for training and the remaining for testing. The
training of ID3 depends on a hyper-parameter that specifies the
tree depth. In our study, we tune this parameter until the testing
accuracy becomes comparable to previous research andwhen over-
fitting appears. The reason for requiring over-fitting, as the litera-
ture unveils, is to preserve success space of MIA.
Recall that our goal is to deploy DP against MIA and understand
the vulnerability disparity. Intuitively, the basis of such a goal is
the success of MIA. We, therefore, consider one of the strongest
attack where the adversary is fully aware of the target model and
has access to part of the original training samples. While training
the attack model, we reuse the target model as the shadow model.
We also respectively pick 15% from the target model’s training and
testing samples as the synthesized data6. We follow the previous
research [52] and construct the attack model as a neural network
which consists of one hidden full-connection layer with 300 neu-
rons and a soft-max layer for the output.
Evaluationmetrics.Our evaluation metrics include: (1) the accu-
racy of the target model on training and testing data respectively,
and (2) precision and recall of MIA. The accuracy of the target
2Adult dataset: https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Adult
3COMPAS dataset: https://github.com/propublica/COMPAS-analysis/
4Browarddataset: https://farid.berkeley.edu/downloads/publications/scienceadvances17/
5Hospital dataset: https://www.dshs.texas.gov/THCIC/Hospitals/Download.shtm
6For the COMPASs dataset, more than 15% of original samples are used due to the
small size of the entire dataset
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Table 2: Results of reproduction of MIA
Dataset T-Depth1 T-Train2 T-Test MIA Pre3 MIA Rec 3
Adult 14 0.96 0.79 0.627∗4 0.83
Broward 8 0.95 0.58 0.63 0.96
COMPAS 10 0.75 0.70 0.56 0.76
Hospital 15 0.89 0.56 0.636 0.67
1 T-Depth indicates depth of the decision tree that works as the target
model
2 T-Train indicate Target-Train
3 Pre and Rec indicate precision and recall of MIA
4 * indicates results outperforming the original evaluation of MIA [52]
model on the training (testing, resp.) data is measured as the pre-
diction precision (i.e., the fraction of classification results that are
correct) on the training (testing, resp.) data. We follow the defini-
tion of precision and recall in [53] to evaluate the performance of
MIA. The precision of MIA is calculated as the fraction of records
inferred as members are indeed members of the training dataset,
and the recall is measured as the fraction of the members that are
correctly inferred as members by MIA.
Results and analysis.We respectively select 20% of the training
and testing data (which are not overlapping with the sub-set to
train the target model) to evaluate performance of MIA. Table 2 re-
ports the average precision and recall of MIA by five rounds. Over-
all, MIA demonstrates effective exploitationwhile the target model
achieve satisfactory accuracy. In particular, for the Adult dataset,
both MIA and the target model outperform their counterparts in
the initial MIA work [52]. It is worth noting that we escalate the
fidelity of MIA on Adult dataset from nearly random guess (50.3%)
to a meaningful level (62.7%). On Hospital dataset, the accuracy
of the target model as well as the precision and recall of MIA are
comparable to the previous study [52]. We could not compare the
performance on Broward and COMPAS datasets as they were not
used in the previous study [52].
We have to note that the results of our MIA reproduction com-
ply with the common understanding of the community that the
feasibility of MIA is attributable to over-fitting of the target model.
Considering the gap between training accuracy and testing accu-
racy as themetric, all our four target models carry a certain level of
over-fitting, well matching the effectiveness of MIA. Also it is ob-
servable that larger gaps lead to more severe attacks (see Broward
v.s. COMPAS).
3.2 Defending MIA with DP
Design of defense. As MIA runs solely on the outputs of the tar-
get model, making the target model differentially private, by de-
sign, can defend against the MIA attack. There are two approaches
to enforce DP on the target model: (1) introduce noise to the input
data [10, 18] and (2) add perturbation to the target model [24, 31].
The first approach, however, often perturbs the data points, and
thus possibly ruins the mapping between the original samples and
the differentially private ones. This, as we will explain later, pre-
vents our measurement of vulnerability disparity. Hence, we de-
cide to enforce the ID3 target model with DP by following the de-
sign and implementation in [19, 24]. The algorithm is summarized
Algorithm 1 DP-ID3 [24]. Operations that enforce DP are high-
lighted in boxes with red outline.
1: procedure Buid_SuLQ_ID3(T , A, C, d , ϵ)
2: Input: T - private dataset, A = {Ai , ...Ad } - a set of at-
tributes, C - class attribute, d - maximal tree depth, ϵ - differ-
ential privacy budget
3: m = |A| (i.e. # of attributes)
4: if A = ∅ or d=0
5: Tc=Partition(T ,∀c ∈ C : rC = c)
6: ∀c ∈ C : Nc = −1.0
7: ∀c ∈ C : while(Nc < 0) Nc = |Tc | + Lap(0,1/ϵ)
8: S =
∑
∀c ∈C
Nc
9: ∀c ∈ C : Pc =
Nc
S
10: return a set of probability Pc
11: end if
12: for every attribute A ∈ A do
13: Tj =Partition(T , ∀j ∈ A : rA = j)
14: ∀j ∈ A : Tj,c = Partition(Tj ,∀c ∈ C : rC = c)
15: NAj = |Tj | + Lap(0,2m/ϵ)
16: NAj,c = |Tj,c | + Lap(0,2m/ϵ)
17: VA =
∑ |A |
j=1
∑ |C |
c=1 N
A
j,c · loд
NAj,c
NAj
18: end for
19: A = arдmaxAVA
20: Ti = Partition(T , ∀i ∈ A : rA = i)
21: ∀i ∈ A : SubTreei = Build_SuLQ_ID3(Ti ,A\A,C,d − 1,ϵ)
22: return a tree with a root node labeled A and edges labeled
1 to |A| each going to SubTreei
23: end procedure
in Algorithm 1 and we name it DP-ID3. Briefly speaking, DP-ID3
adds Laplace noise to the count that is used to compute information
gain (line 15-16) and the voting on the leaf node (line 7). DP-ID3
has been proven to satisfy DP [6].
The performance of DP-ID3 depends on the setup of privacy
budget ϵ . We base the selection of privacy budget on performance
of MIA. To be specific, we pick a range of privacy budgets where
MIA shifts from being slightly weakened to being nearly disabled.
The final ranges of privacy budgets are observable in Figure 2; the
privacy budget ranges in [0.01, 100].
Results and analysis. In Figure 2, we present the precision and
recall of the target model and MIA for various privacy budgets.
For the sake of normalizing randomness of DP, all the tests are
repeated 25 times and we report the average results. Unsurpris-
ingly, both precision and recall of the target model decreases when
DP strength increases. However, DP also demonstrates high de-
fense effectiveness against MIA. For all the four datasets, as DP
strength increases (i.e., the privacy budget decreases), the preci-
sion of MIA persistently drop and finally approach the level of
random guess. We analyze why DP can defend against MIA. In
essence, the defense of DP derives from its effects on reducing the
over-fitting property of the target model. More specifically, DP in-
troduces Laplace noise to the training process of the target model,
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(a) Adult Dataset (Tree depth=14) (b) Broward Dataset (Tree depth=11) (c) COMPAS Dataset (Tree depth=8) (d) Hospital Dataset (Tree depth=15)
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Figure 2: Performance of target model and MIA under different privacy budgets.
which, on one hand, fuzzifies the choice of attribute for tree split-
ting (line 15-16 of Algorithm 1) and, on the other hand, dilutes
the purity of the leaf nodes (line 7 of Algorithm 1). Therefore, DP
generalizes the decision boundary of the target model, making it
less fit the training data.
We also notice that on COMPAS dataset, the recall of MIA sur-
prisingly increases quicklywhile DP gets stronger.We investigated
the underlying cause of this phenomenon. It turned out that MIA
labels more samples in the testing data as positive when DP gets
stronger. Therefore, the recall increases sharplywhile the precision
drops to approximately 0.5 (i.e., random guess).
4 UNDERSTANDING OF VULNERABILITY
DISPARITY
In principle, DP only constrains the upperbound of privacy that
each individual can lose. However, DP does not ensure that differ-
ent population groups experience the same amount of actual pri-
vacy leakage. In particular, the imbalanced data distribution of dif-
ferent demographic groups (e.g., white vs black people) may lead
to inequitable privacy protection. In this section, we unveil this
type of inequitability in using DP as a defense against MIA.
4.1 Definition of Vulnerability Disparity
To measure the vulnerability a particular group is against MIA at-
tack, We define the concept of vulnerability disparity . Vulnerabil-
ity disparity (VD) is adapted from the standard fairness definition
of equal opportunity (Equation 1). Formally, given a datasetD and a
protected attributeA, where A = a and A = a¯ define the protected
and unprotected groups respectively,
We define the vulnerability disparityVD of MIA on D as:
VD = P(Yˆ = 1|Y = 1,A = a) − P(Yˆ = 1|Y = 1,A = a¯), (2)
where Yˆ denotes the binary output label of MIA. In particular, Y =
1 denotes that the data point is a member of D. Intuitively, VD
describes the difference of the success probability of MIA for the
protected group (A = a) versus the unprotected group (A = a¯).
WhenVD > 0 (VD < 0, resp.), the protected group (A = a) is more
Table 3: Skewness of group distribution
Adult Broward COMPAS Hospital
Race Count Race Count Race Count Race Count
Asian 4.22k Hispa. 1.93k Hispa. 3.47k Asian 13.73k
Black 0.35k Black 9.54k Black 10.80k Black 33.77k
White 38.90k White 5.36 k White 8.82k White 56.66k
Other 1.73k Other 0.41k Other 14.46k Other 6.06k
(a) Race Group
Adult Broward COMPAS Hospital
Gen Count Gen Count Gen Count Gen Count
M 30.51k M 14.71k M 16.50k M 76.91k
F 14.69k F 2.54k F 8.03k F 33.31k
(b) Gender Group
vulnerable (less vulnerable, resp.) than the unprotected group (A =
a¯) against MIA.
The definition of VD can be applied tomeasure the protection of
DP against MIA too. Formally, the vulnerability disparityVDDP of
a differentially private mechanismDP can bemeasured by simply
adapting Formula 2 as following:
VDDP = P(YˆDP = 1|Y = 1,A = a) − P(YˆDP = 1|Y = 1,A = a¯),
(3)
where YˆDP denotes the prediction of MIA by using the output of
the differentially private target model as input. In the ideal case, if a
differentially private ML algorithm provides fair group protection,
then VDDP = 0.
To measure the impact of DP on VD, we measure the change of
VD before and after the deployment of DP. Formally, let VD and
VDDP be the VD before and after DP deployment on the target
model. The change c of vulnerability disparity is measured as:
c =
VDDP −VD
VD
, (4)
Intuitively, c < 0 (c > 0, resp.) means that the DP mechanism
decreases (increases, resp.) VD.
Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA Bo Zhang, Ruotong Yu, Haipei Sun, Yanying Li, Jun Xu and Hui Wang
-0.1
-0.05
 0
 0.05
 0.1
No DP 100 25 5 1 0.05
Vu
ln
er
ab
ilit
y 
Di
sp
ar
ity
Privacy Budget
Male
Female
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
No DP 1 0.5 0.1 0.05 0.01
Vu
ln
er
ab
ilit
y 
Di
sp
ar
ity
Privacy Budget
Male
Female
-0.4
-0.2
 0
 0.2
 0.4
No DP 1 0.5 0.1 0.05 0.01
Vu
ln
er
ab
ilit
y 
Di
sp
ar
ity
Privacy Budget
Male
Female
-0.4
-0.2
 0
 0.2
 0.4
No DP 5 1 0.5 0.1 0.05
Vu
ln
er
ab
ilit
y 
Di
sp
ar
ity
Privacy Budget
Male
Female
(a) ADULT (Gender) (b) BROWARD (Gender) (c) COMPAS (Gender) (d) Hospital (Gender)
-0.1
-0.05
 0
 0.05
 0.1
No DP 100 25 5 1 0.05
Vu
ln
er
ab
ilit
y 
Di
sp
ar
ity
Privacy Budget
White
Non-White
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
 0
 0.02
 0.04
 0.06
 0.08
No DP 1 0.5 0.1 0.05 0.01
Vu
ln
er
ab
ilit
y 
Di
sp
ar
ity
Privacy Budget
Black
Non-Black
-0.1
-0.05
 0
 0.05
 0.1
No DP 1 0.5 0.1 0.05 0.01
Vu
ln
er
ab
ilit
y 
Di
sp
ar
ity
Privacy Budget
Black
Non-Black
-0.04
-0.02
 0
 0.02
 0.04
No DP 5 1 0.5 0.1 0.05
Vu
ln
er
ab
ilit
y 
Di
sp
ar
ity
Privacy Budget
White
Non-White
(e) ADULT (Race) (f) BROWARD (Race) (g) COMPAS (Race) (h)Hospital (Race)
Figure 3: Vulnerability disparity before and after DP enforcement (“No DP” means before DP is deployed).
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Figure 4: Change of Vulnerability disparity by DP.
4.2 Measurement of Vulnerability Disparity
In this section, we present the results and analysis of vulnerability
disparity. To eliminate the impact of randomness by DP, we ran the
experiments 25 times on all four datasets and took the average.
Protected attributes and groups. By following the literature on
algorithmic fairness research, we pick race and gender as the pro-
tected attributes. We must note that in all the four datasets that we
use, the classification labels do not have strong correlation with
race and gender. In other words, the classification results do not
strongly depend on these two protected attributes. Two groups ex-
ist on the gender attribute: male and female. The data on the race
attribute consists of four groups. However, for simplicity, we cat-
egorize the data into two race groups only: black and non-black.
The non-black group consists of all members that are not black
(e.g., White, Asian, and Hispanic).
Skewness of group distribution. The distribution of different
population groups on the protected attributes of the four datasets
are shown in Table 3. Obviously, the group distribution of all the
four datasets is heavily imbalanced. Furthermore, the same race
group does not always have the same distribution in different datasets.
For example, thewhite group dominates in Adult dataset, while the
black group dominates in Broward dataset. On gender attribute,
the male group always dominates the female group in all the four
datasets. Although it seemly has no direct connection between the
vulnerability disparity and race/gender, we will explore if there is
any hidden disparity due to the imbalanced data distribution of
these two protected attributes.
Main results. The results of VD before and after applying DP on
the target model are illustrated in Figure 3. The results of VD reduc-
tion for various privacy budgets is shown in Figure 4. We briefly
summarize the main observations below:
(1) Different datasets show different amounts of VD, for both be-
fore and after DP deployment (as shown in Figure 3).
• Adult dataset: insignificant VD (< 0.04) on both race and
gender groups before and after DP enforcement.
• Broward and COMPAS datasets: significant VD (≥ 0.1) on
the gender groups before and after DP deployment. Insignif-
icant VD (≤ 0.04) on the race groups before and after DP
enforcement.
• Hospital dataset: insignificant VD (< −0.01) on both gender
and race groups before DP. Significant VD (≥ 0.1) after DP
on gender groups but insignificant VD on race groups after
DP enforcement.
(2) DP cannot eliminate VD completely on both gender and race
attributes. There is no consistent pattern of how VD changes
by DP deployment (as shown in Figure 4).
• Adult dataset: On both gender and race attributes, VD de-
creases until the privacy budget decreases to 1. Then VD
switches to opposite direction and increases.
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• Broward dataset: VD increases after DP deployment on both
gender and race groups. The increment is small and sta-
ble on race groups, but significant and unsteady on gender
groups.
• COMPAS dataset: VD increases after DP deployment, except
when privacy budget is 1 and 0.5. The pattern is opposite
to Broward dataset - VD increment is small and stable on
gender groups, but significant and volatile on race groups.
• Hospital dataset: On gender attributes VD increases to be
significant (> 0.1) after DP deployment. On race attribute,
VD keeps stable.
Next, we explain more details of our observations. We will pro-
vide detailed analysis of the underlying reasoning behind these ob-
servations in Section 4.3.
VD measurement before DP deployment.We make one in-
teresting observation from Figure 3 (for the case of “No DP”). In all
datasets, the smaller group is not always more vulnerable against
MIA than the larger group. For example, as shown in Figure 3 (b),
the male group is always more vulnerable than the female group in
Broward & Adult datasets, while the female group is more vulner-
able than the male group in COMPAS and Hospital datasets. This
shows that VD is not directly related to the group distribution of
the protected attributes alone.
VDmeasurement after DP. As shown in Figure 3, our results
support the conclusion that DP cannot eliminate VD. Furthermore,
the strength of DP (controlled by using various privacy budgets)
has some clear impacts on VD. However, the change of VD does
not change linearly with the privacy budget.
Change of VD by DP. The results (Figure 4) do not show a con-
sistent pattern of VD reduction when the privacy budget increases.
Furthermore, DP does not always reduce the amounts of VD. On
Hospital dataset DP even increases VD (as shown in Figure 3 (d))
from close to 0 to as large as 0.2.
4.3 Analysis of Vulnerability Disparity
In this section, we explain the reasons behind our main observa-
tions in Section 4.2.
In a MIA attack, both target and attack models together create a
mapping from the input domain to MIA predictions. Remind that
the input of MIA, which is also the output of the target model,
consists of a vector of prediction probabilities, each probability
measuring if an input data point belongs to a specific class i . In
essence, MIA maps each prediction probability to a binary label.
Certain ranges of prediction probabilities are projected to the pos-
itive label by MIA (i.e., predicted as members). Intuitively, VD is
directly related to how the training samples from different groups
are mapped to the binary label. Recall that VD indeed measures
the difference of recall of different groups. Following the above rea-
soning, we performed a set of experiments to measure the recall
of different groups before and after DP is enforced on the target
model. To better illustrate our results, we evenly split the probabil-
ity domain [0, 1] into 10 ranges, each of size 0.1. For each range r ,
we count the number of records (denoted as cA=ar ) in group A = a
that are labeled with the positive label by MIA and their predic-
tion probability falls into r . Then we calculate the recall of a group
A = a in the range r , denoted as Recr , as
RecA=ar =
cA=ar
cA=a
, (5)
where cA=a is the number of records in group A = a that are la-
beled with the positive label by MIA. Apparently, the difference
(RecA=ar − Rec
A=a¯
r ) between the recall of the two groups in the
range r equals the amount of VD in r . Also it must be true that:
VD =
10∑
i=1
(RecA=ari − Rec
A=a¯
ri ).
In otherwords, the sum of the recall difference in each range should
equal to VD of the whole dataset. We illustrate the results of recall
by probability range in Figure 5.
Explanations.Next,Wewill answer the following three questions
raised from our observations in Section 4.2 by analyzing how the
recall of different groups vary, and how the recall per group shifts
with regards to different degrees of privacy protection (controlled
by privacy budget ϵ). We vary ϵ from 0.1 to 5 (i.e., from strong to
weak privacy protection).
Why does VD exist? As shown in Figure 5 (a), (f), (k) and (p),
before the deployment of DP, various groups have different recall
in each probability range. For instance, consider Broward dataset
(Figure 5 (a)), the true positive records mostly cover the prediction
probabilities in the range of [0, 0.1), in which the recall of male
and female groups differ around 10%. This leads to the VD (around
0.1) of the two groups (Figure 4 (b)). The same observation also
holds on the other three datasets. We have to note that on ADULT
dataset, the positive records mainly cover two ranges of prediction
probabilities, [0, 0.1) and [0.9, 1]. These two ranges show the op-
posite recall results: the recall of the male group is higher than
the female group in the range [0, 0.1) while opposite in the range
[0.9, 1]. Also the recall difference in these two ranges is of similar
amounts. Therefore, the VD on ADULT dataset is relatively small
(as shown in Figure 3 (a)).
What determines the amount of VD? Since the target model
determines such recall difference, we next investigate if the gen-
der feature is the main factor. We identify the important features
of Broward dataset, which are those features that directly effect
the output probability vector of the target model. It turns out that
the top-3 important features of Broward dataset is Decile, Priors#,
and Age. We studied two data distributions: (1) data distribution
D1 on the combination of the four features (i.e., the top-3 impor-
tant features plus gender); and (2) data distributionD2 on the top-3
important features. We compared D1 and D2, and found out that
the difference between D1 and D2 is closely (not completely) con-
sistent with the recall distribution shown in Figure 5 (a). The same
observation also holds on other datasets. For example, on ADULT
dataset, whose top-3 important features are Education,Marital Sta-
tus, andCap_Gain, shows almost identical distributions on the com-
bination of top-3 important features alone and the top-3 features
plus gender. This leads to the small VD on Adult dataset (Figure 3
(a)). In summary, the amount of VD is not determined by the data
distribution on the protected attribute alone. Instead, it is deter-
mined by the data distribution on the combination of the protected
attribute with other attributes (sometimes the top-3 important fea-
tures are sufficient).
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Figure 5: Recall of different groups by prediction probability range
How does DP impact VD? As shown in Figure 5, on all the
four datasets, introducing noise to the target model makes fun-
damental impacts on its output. Specifically, smaller privacy bud-
get (i.e., stronger privacy protection) introduces more randomness
into the target model, and thus more unique prediction probabili-
ties in the output of the target model. These probabilities scatter
more widely in the domain. Meanwhile, from the perspective of
individual records, due to the noise added by DP, the prediction
probability of two identical records can be different. Therefore,
smaller privacy budget leads to higher likelihood that two iden-
tical records are output as different prediction probabilities by the
target model. However, our analysis shows that there is no linear
correlation between the privacy budget and the size of unsafe ar-
eas (i.e., the number of prediction probabilities that are mapped
to the positive label by MIA), due to the randomness of perturba-
tion on the target model added by DP. In other words, the mapping
from the input domain to MIA predictions becomes probabilistic.
Therefore, the amount of VD is unpredictable and change incon-
sistently with the increment of the privacy budget. This has been
demonstrated by the results in Figures 3 and 4. This is expected
since DP, as a privacy notion, does not deal with the discriminated
treatment by MIA (indeed any machine learning model) by nature.
Furthermore, since the DP enforcement on the target model does
not consider the protected attributes as well as the data distribu-
tion on these attributes, it is anticipated that DP does not lead to
consistent change of VD on these protected attributes at all.
5 MITIGATION ALGORITHMS FOR
VULNERABILITY DISPARITY
As is illustrated in Section 4.3, the vulnerability disparity is caused
by inconsistent distribution of training samples from different groups.
To fundamentally solve this problem, generally speaking, there are
two approaches. First, we can “optimize” the target model such
that, given the training samples from different groups as inputs, it
produces equally-distributed outputs. Second, we can elaborately
pick similarly-distributed data from different groups to train the
target model. The first approach, however, has several major lim-
itations. First, there lacks theoretical support of designing such a
Privacy for All: Demystify Vulnerability Disparity of Differential Privacy against Membership Inference Aack Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for FairPick
1: Input Dtr ain : Private training data-set; S: Protected attribute
domain; T reduction rate;
2: Let D′tr ain = ∅ to be the training data-set after FairPick
3: Split Dtr ain by the class label and get a set of data-setsCtr ain
4: for each d ∈ Ctr ain do
5: dkmeans = Kmeans(d)
6: In each cluster, calculate its center to construct a new feature
combination.
7: Let f to be the all the feature combination of dkmeans
8: Let f unc . = ∅
9: for i = 1 : |S| do
10: create Equation 7 of del(Gi ,Cj )(1 ≤ j ≤ t) forGi
11: Append the equations to f unc
12: end for
13: ans = quadratic.programming(f unc)
14: dreweiдh = pick_samples(ans, dkmeans )
15: d ′ = Map records in dreweiдh to original records
16: Append d ′ to D′tr ain
17: end for
18: return D′tr ain
model. It remains an open question whether we can achieve our
goal while preserving the properties of the original model. Sec-
ond, it needs separate solutions for different types of target models.
This brings high complexities to generalize the approach. Finally,
it will be incompatible with other defenses on top of the target
model (e.g. , the DP we used in this study) since those defenses can
reversely vary the output distribution. Therefore, in this research,
we choose to explore the second approach.
5.1 Design of Vulnerability Correction
Past research has proposed several data pre-processing approaches
for addressing unfairness issues [36]. In particular, reweighing [7]
and its variants [36] are widely used to facilitate classificationwith-
out discrimination. Technically speaking, reweighing picks train-
ing samples from every group such that they share identical dis-
tribution as the entire data-set in the dimension of label. That is
to say, reweighing makes all groups have consistent distribution
when we consider the label as the index. By intuition, we can ex-
tend reweighing to achieve our goal by considering the feature
combination as the label. This approach, however, can have two
problems because of reweighing’s strict requirement of distribu-
tion. First, reweighing frequently needs to over-pick (or duplicate)
samples from a group to meet the needs of distribution. However,
from a practical perspective, the over-picked samples do not truly
affect the distribution of real samples. Therefore, reweighing may
not provide realistic protection. Second, the feature combinations
are often sparsely distributed, in particular when the features are
many while the data-set is small. As a consequence, plenty of fea-
ture combinations only appear in a specific group and to ensure
consistent distributions, reweighing has to delete sampleswith those
feature combinations. This frequently leads to over-deletion and
makes the resulted data-set unusable.
Our approach. To address the above problems, we propose Fair-
Pick. Instead of seeking fully consistent distribution among dif-
ferent groups, FairPick reduces the distribution difference by a
pre-defined threshold. Formally, we consider a data-set D and a
protected attribute Fp which defines n groups {G1,G2, ...,Gn}. Be-
yond Fp , the data has a group of other attributes {F1, F2, ..., Fm}.
From all records in D, {F1, F2, ..., Fm} has t unique combinations
{C1,C2, ...,Ct }. With sum(Gi) indicating the total number of train-
ing samples in group Gi and sum(Gi ,Cj ) referring to the number
of training samples with combination Cj in groupGi , the distribu-
tion difference on Cj betweenGi and other groups can be defined
as:
dvar (Gi ,Cj ) =
sum(Gi ,Cj )
sum(Gi)
−
∑k,i sum(Gk ,Cj )∑k,i sum(Gk )
(6)
After applying FairPick, we require that:
∀i ∈ [1,n],∀j ∈ [1, t], dvar (Gi ,Cj ,post) = dvar (Gi ,Cj ,pre) ∗T
(7)
where dvar (Gi ,Cj ,pre) and dvar (Gi ,Cj ,post) respectively repre-
sent dvar (Gi ,Cj ) before and after FairPick, and T (0 ≤ T ≤ 1) is
a user-specified threshold. To better understand the effects of Equa-
tion 7 onVD, let’s assume that the unsafe areas contain {Cu1,Cu2, ...,Cuk }
(which will be determined as training samples by MIA). For sim-
plicity, we also assume the unsafe areas do not shift after FairPick.
Under such contexts, VD pertaining to group Gi , before and after
we apply FairPick, respectively equals to
∑uk
n=u1 dvar (Gi ,Cj ,pre)
and
∑uk
n=u1 dvar (Gi ,Cj ,post). According to Equation 7, it is not
hard to observe that VD will be reduced by (1 −T ).
To solve Equation 7, we consider deleting del(Gi ,Cj ) (0 ≤ j ≤
t ,0 ≤ i ≤ n) samples that have feature combinationsCj from group
Gi . This creates t ∗n variables. Including del(Gi ,Cj ) to Equation 6,
we will have dvar (Gi ,Cj ,post) equal to:
sum(Gi ,Cj ) − del(Gi ,Cj )
sum(Gi) −
∑t
n=1 del(Gi ,Cn)
−
∑k,i (sum(Gk ,Cj ) − del(Gk ,Cj ))∑k,i (sum(Gk ) −
∑t
n=1 del(Gk ,Cn))
(8)
By correlating Equation 8 with Equation 7, we can establish t ∗ n
equations withdel(Gi ,Cj ) (0 ≤ j ≤ t ,0 ≤ i ≤ n) as variables. While
it is hard to derive general solutions, these equations are typically
solvable with quadratic programming [22].
Challenges in practice. Under practice settings, FairPick, how-
ever, can encounter several challenges. We elaborate on these chal-
lenges and how we handle them in the following.
• As aforementioned, the distribution of feature combination is
often sparse. Many feature combinations can only have 1 or 2
instances in a single group. For such feature combinations, Fair-
Pick often gives small decimal values as the number of instances
to delete. By intuition, we can simply round the decimal val-
ues up/down to integers. However, rounding these values up
can result in data over-deletion while rounding them down will
eliminate the reduction effects. To systematically address this
problem, we propose feature aggregation. Specifically, we run
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Figure 6: Impacts of FairPick in the target model and MIA (BR:Before reduction by FairPick; AR: After reduction by FairPick)
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Figure 7: Effectiveness of FairPick on VD reduction. Herein -x% indicates FairPick reduces VD by x%.
K-means to classify the training samples into K clusters and con-
sider each cluster center as a new unique feature combination.
When applying FairPick, we replace each samplewith its K-means
center. If data deletion is needed for a K-means center, we ran-
domly pick samples from the corresponding cluster. After the
process of FairPick, we then map the remaining samples back
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to their original values. The rationale behind our feature aggre-
gation is that samples in the same cluster are in principle close
and therefore, have similar probability of being attacked. To de-
termine K for feature aggregation, we pick the largest K that
ensures every group has at least a certain amount of samples in
each cluster.
• In certain cases, FairPick can require to delete a negative num-
ber of samples (i.e., del(Gi ,Cj ) < 0). This indicates the needs of
duplicating samples. However, as is previously explained, sam-
ple duplication provides no real protection. To address this is-
sue, we restrict the number of negative deletions. Specifically,
we enumerate T to find the values that preserves the utilities
of the target model but requires less than an expected amount
of negative deletions. With the above condition holds, we then
simply ignore all the negative deletions requested by FairPick.
• In our explanation with the effects of FairPick on VD, we as-
sume the unsafe areas do not shift. This is, however, not the
case in practice. As FairPick alters the distribution of training
samples, it will bring changes to the target model and hence, af-
fect the unsafe areas. We argue that the shifting of unsafe ar-
eas should be insignificant because, as unveiled by the litera-
ture [41], MIA essentially attacks out-liers which usually span a
specific ranges. Further, our evaluation in Section 5.2 illustrates
FairPickworks as exacted in practical settings where the unsafe
areas may indeed shift.
To sum up, FairPick follows Algorithm 2 to reduce distribution
difference among differen groups.
5.2 Evaluation of Unfairness Correction
To understand the utility of FairPick for VD reduction, we per-
form a group of evaluation. In the following, we cover the details.
Experiment setup. In the evaluation, we first apply FairPick to
the training data and then follow Section 3 for the reproduction of
MIA and the use of DP against MIA. As introduced in Section 2.1,
MIA trains label-class-specific attack models. Therefore, we group
the training samples based on their labels and separately apply
FairPick to each of the sub-groups. Following Section 4.2, we con-
sider gender and race as the protected groups (gender defines male
and female; race defines black and non-black). Recall that FairPick
performs K-means for feature aggregation. In this evaluation, we
pick K to ensure each cluster has more than 10 samples. Further,
we follow the approach described in Section 5.1 to determine the
threshold for VD reduction. For the simplicity of presentation, we
pick three thresholds that work for all the four data-sets (including
0.4, 0.6, and 0.8). Finally, to reduce randomness, we repeat each
test 25 times and report the average results.
Impact on target model andMIA. By intuition, FairPickworks
by deleting training samples, which can hurt the target model and
further affect the attack models. To verify this intuition, we com-
pare the performance of the target model and the attack models
before and after we apply FairPick. In Figure 6, we present the
comparison results. Note that to better visualize the comparison,
we only show FairPick with T = 0.8. FairPick with T = 0.4 and
T = 0.6 has similar results.
Overall, FairPick can largely preserve the accuracy of the target
model. In the case of Broward, the target model has nearly consis-
tent accuracy after we apply FairPick. On the data-sets of Adult
and Hospital, FairPick barely affects the target model’s testing ac-
curacy. It, however, slightly increases the training accuracy of the
target model. This is most likely because, to reduce distribution
difference, FairPick deletes out-lier samples that only appear in
certain groups and thus, makes the target model more centralized
to better fit the training samples. In the case of Compas, FairPick
has no obvious impacts on the testing accuracy but increases the
training accuracy by 15% when we consider gender as the pro-
tected group. We believe this again is because FairPick deletes
irregularly-distributed samples such that the the target model be-
comes less scattered. As we can also observe in Figure 6, FairPick
has similar effects on the target model with orwithoutDP. This fur-
ther proves that FairPick is not impeding the target model and
more importantly, FairPick is compatible with using DP as a de-
fense.
With regards to the impacts on MIA, FairPick shows similar
patterns to its effects on the target model. This is understandable
since MIA is largely determined by the target model. To be spe-
cific, on the Adult, Broward, and Hospital data-sets, MIA all has
highly similar recall and precision with or without FairPick. The
only significant difference incurred by FairPick is MIA’s recall on
the Compas data-set.When we consider gender as the protected at-
tribute for Compas, FairPick increases MIA’s recall by around 10%.
This, as explained above, is because the data deletion by FairPick
makes the target model over-fit the training samples and there-
fore, leads MIA to have higher effectiveness. If we consider race
as the protected attribute for Compas, MIA’ recall is down-graded
by around 10%. We believe this is likely due to randomness as the
recall consistently increases when DP is augmented. To sum up,
FairPick only incurs slight (near zero in many cases) changes to
the performance of MIA. This is critical for our study because this
helps confirm that VD reduction (if observed) is indeed attributable
to FairPick instead of variance in MIA’s performance.
EffectivenessofVD reduction. In Figure 7, we present the reduc-
tion of VD after we apply FairPick. In general, FairPick demon-
strates expected effects on VD reduction. Particularly, when the
original VD is significant (VD > 0.1, Broward and Compas in Fig-
ure 3), we observe stable and effective reduction. With the two
data-sets, the average reduction rate consistently exceeds 30% (un-
der different T ). Also observable in Figure 7 is that the reduction
by FairPick is independent with DP. This, again, proves that Fair-
Pick is compatible with DP and can complement DP to provide fair
protection.
From Figure 7, we can also see a pattern (despite somewhat
unstable) that the reduction of VD increases while we decrease
T (namely increase the expected reduction rate). Such patterns
are especially significant in the case of Compas (with race), Adult
(with gender), Broward (with race), and Hospital (with gender).
This shows that our set-up ofT works as expected, providing user
the flexibility of choosing fairness level on demands.
We also note cases where FairPick does not reduce VD but in-
stead increases its value. We reason each of the cases as follows.
In the case of Adult (with gender as the protected attribute) and
Hospital (with race as the protected attributed), the original VD
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is very insignificant. A slight change or randomness will lead to
major VD changes. As such, the effectiveness of FairPick can be
masked and not observable. In the case of Broward with gender as
the protected attribute, FairPick increases VD when T = 0.4. In
this case, among all the deletion requests by FairPick, over half of
them are negative deletions (namely duplication). Recall that Fair-
Pick ignores such requests. Therefore, it has no reduction effects.
On the contrary, its half-done reduction accidentally increases the
variances in data distribution.
To sum up, our evaluation shows FairPick can provide reliable
and effective VD reduction under practical settings.
6 RELATED WORK
In this section, we review the related work on MIA attacks and
defenses, DP and its evaluation, and fairness in ML.
Membership inference attacks and defensesMIAwas initially
proposed by Shokri et al. [53]. Under a black-box settingwhere the
target model is unknown, MIApredictswhether a given recordwas
used in training the target model. Afterwards, several follow-up
works provide more detailed study. [57] characterized the attack
vulnerability with respect to types of learning models, data distri-
bution, and transferablity. [49] proposed new membership infer-
ence attacks by relaxing the assumptions of the original attack in
[53] in both model types and data. [41] generalized MIA by identi-
fying vulnerable records and indirect inference. Recently, [45] pro-
posed new MIA attack against white-box ML models. Also MIA
attack has been used to attack Federated learning [45], collabora-
tive learning [43], generative adversarial networks (GANs) [29],
and adversarially robust deep learning models [55].
Several defensemechanisms have been designed to defend against
MIA, including dropout and model stacking [49], adversarial regu-
larization [44], L2-regularizer [53], and adversarial examples [34].
None of these techniques can provide a provable privacy guar-
antee against MIA. In this paper, we mainly consider differential
privacy [19] as the defense mechanism against MIA, as it can pro-
vide a theoretical privacy guarantee.
Differential privacy andMachine LearningDifferential privacy
(DP) [19] has become the de facto standard inmeasuring the disclo-
sure of privacy pertaining to individuals. To accommodate differ-
ent types of machine learning models, there have developed vari-
ous mechanisms to enforce DP [14, 42, 59]. The mechanisms can
be categorized into two types: (1) pre-processing: the training data
is perturbed by generating synthetic data with differential privacy
[10, 12]; and (2) in-processing: add noise to the objective function of
the learning model (e.g., [9, 30, 31, 62]) or or to the gradient in each
iteration of gradient descent or stochastic gradient descent that is
used to minimize the objective function [4, 56]. We refer the au-
thors to some good surveys [20, 32, 33] for more readings. Going
beyond classic machine learning models, Shokri et al. extend DP to
deep neural networks [52]. Following that, Abadi et al. propose an
alternative approach that performs randomized perturbation dur-
ing the stochastic gradient descent process [2]. Unlike these works
that focus on exploring DP mechanisms on machine learning mod-
els and strive for the balance between utility and privacy guaran-
tees, our research considers the fairness issues behind DP and en-
deavors to providing mitigation.
Algorithmic fairness in ML Several competing notions of fair-
ness have been recently proposed in the machine learning litera-
ture. The definition of fairness can be categorized into three types
[46]: i) it is not based on protected attributes such as gender or race
(fair treatment), ii) it does not disproportionately benefit or hurt
individuals (fair impact), and iii) given the target outcomes, it en-
forces equal discrepancies between decisions and target outcomes
across groups of individuals based on their protected characteristic
(fair supervised performance).
An example of fair treatment is fairness through unawareness
[27] that ignores the protected attributes.
Examples of fair impact constraints include 80% rule [21] and
demographic parity [7, 37]. Examples of fair supervised perfor-
mance constraints include equal opportunity and equal odds [28]
and de-correlation [61]. Most of these definitions focus on fairness
of groups (i.e., individuals who share the same value on the pro-
tected attributes). Individual fairness [16, 40, 58] is defined as a
non-preferential treatment towards an individual. Counterfactual
fairness [25, 40] evaluates fairness in terms of causal inference and
counterfactural examples.
Techniques to design bias mitigation algorithms typically iden-
tify a fairness notion of interest first, and modify a particular point
of ML pipeline to satisfy it. Methodologically, they fall broadly into
three categories: (1) pre-processing: the bias in the training data is
mitigated [7, 21, 35]; (2) in-processing: the machine learning model
is modified by adding fairness as additional constraint [8, 26, 61];
and (3) post-processing: the results of a previously trained classifier
are modified to achieve the desired results on different groups [28].
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
Fairness and privacy are two equally important issues for machine
learning. Most of the recent studies have investigated these two
issues separately. No attention has been paid to fair privacy, i.e.,
privacy models and their enforcement mechanisms should not dis-
proportionately benefit or hurt individuals. We are the first to ex-
amine fair privacy in the context of membership inference attack
and differential privacy as the defense mechanism. We provide ex-
tensive empirical evidence that vulnerability disparity against MIA
exists, without and with DP applied. We performed detailed analy-
sis to identify the source of such vulnerability disparity. Based on
our findings, we designed a new mitigation method named Fair-
Pick that adjusts the distribution of the training data. Our results
show that FairPick can effectively reduce VD for both without
and with DP deployment.
Future Work. There are quite a few interesting research direc-
tions to explore. First, we will investigate if vulnerability disparity
exists for different target models with DP (e.g., differentially pri-
vate DNN [3]) and different defense mechanisms (e.g., [44, 49, 53])
against MIA. Second, we will consider different fairness metrics
to evaluate vulnerability disparity. In this paper, we mainly focus
on vulnerability disparity of different groups. Recently, individ-
ual fairness has attracted much attention in the machine learn-
ing community. Briefly speaking, individual fairness requires that
similar objects should receive similar treatment. Consider DP de-
fends against MIA. If a record R1 is exposed by MIA but its sim-
ilar records are not, apparently it does not ensure the individual
fairness. We will examine if such individual vulnerability disparity
Privacy for All: Demystify Vulnerability Disparity of Differential Privacy against Membership Inference Aack Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
against MIA exists before and after DP. As pointed out by [41], an
outlier is more likely to be a vulnerable target record. This can be
the starting point of the analysis of individual vulnerability dispar-
ity.
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